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We study the effect of product market competition on the incentives to engage in 
earnings manipulation and we find that they crucially depend on the level of visibility 
of firm real activity in the marketplace. If investors can perfectly observe real firm 
output and sales, then CEOs are forced to act in the marketplace in a consistent 
manner with the earnings they are reporting. We show in a simple model how this is 
too expensive in more competitive markets and therefore competition should reduce 
rather than increase earnings manipulation. On the contrary, if investors and analysts 
cannot observe firm real output in the marketplace we show how manipulating 
earnings might be particularly rewarding in more competitive markets since the boost 
in market value of good news is especially important. Using a large panel dataset, we 
report empirical evidence that systematically and consistently points out to a positive 
effect of product market competition on the level of earnings management. This has 
been found with three different proxies of market competition, three alternate 
specifications of the “Jones” earnings management model, earnings quality measures 
and with different econometric techniques that alleviate endogeneity concerns 
including firm fixed effects and controls of firm corporate governance. 
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Since Adam Smith, mainstream Economics has argued that product market 
competition constitutes a superior mechanism for the efficient allocation of resources, 
and has a disciplining effect over rent seeking and managerial inefficiencies. Consistent 
with this view, recent literature has empirically shown how “good” corporate governance 
mechanisms are only needed when market rents can be wasted or dissipated (Giroud and 
Mueller, 2008, 2009). Otherwise, just pure market competition directs managers to the 
maximization of shareholder’s wealth, without further need of any particular governance 
procedures or controls. Earnings manipulation has been repeatedly reported as another 
manifestation of managerial rent appropriation, at the expense of shareholders, when 
executives use earnings management for their private interest. This paper investigates the 
disciplinary effect of competition on earnings management arguing (and empirically 
finding) that product competition could increase managerial propensity to engage in 
earnings manipulation. As such, this study is among a select few that provide evidence 
regarding the undesirable effects of competition in a capital markets setting (see Cetorelli, 
2001, for a thorough discussion).  
We build a theoretical model that illustrates how market competition could have a 
dark side regarding accounting practices. This link exists because market competition 
induces higher punishment in the stock market when accounting earnings indicate the 
existence of a competitive disadvantage. However, our model has distinct implications on 
the sign of the competition-accounting manipulation linkage, depending on whether 





production. If this is the case the predicted sign of the linkage reverts and we should 
observe less accounting manipulation in more competitive markets.  
Intuitively, when shareholders/analysts can observe firm individual output 
production, then managers that pretend to be running an efficient corporation not only 
need to manipulate accounting earnings, but also they have to operate in the real market 
as if they were efficient (see Bagnoli and Watts, 2007, and Kedia and Philippon, 2009). 
In these circumstances, the cost of misleading analysts/shareholders by producing larger 
levels of output is costlier in more competitive markets, and therefore, ceteris paribus 
managers should be less prone to manipulate earnings.  
In our empirical analysis, we provide strong evidence of a positive connection 
between market competition and earnings management. This empirical finding is robust 
to the use of three distinct proxies of market competition: the Herfindhal-Hirschman 
industrial concentration index, number of competitors in the industry and changes in 
competition due to changes in import penetration as a result of exogenous differences in 
trade tariffs (Guadalupe and Cuñat, 2009). Our results are also robust to the use of 
distinct specifications of the Jones (1995) measure of earnings manipulation including the 
forward looking model of Dechow, Richardson and Tuma (2003). We also provide 
evidence that product market competition decreases earnings quality using the construct 
of Dechow and Dichev (2002). Furthermore, our results are invariant to control by 
variables related to both earnings management and competitive structure such as 
corporate governance, CEO pay-for-performance and the sophistication of shareholders. 
Finally, our findings do not vary when including firm fixed-effects that alleviate 





This paper has several contributions. First, we identify a key determinant of earnings 
manipulation. Prior research has identified various firm, CEO, and regulatory motivations 
for earnings management (Healy, 1985; Watts and Zimmermann, 1986; Kedia and 
Philippon, 2009). We contribute to this literature by showing that industrial structure, in 
terms of competitive intensity, affects managerial financial reporting decisions. Thus, we 
identify an exogenous non-firm specific factor related to earnings management, which 
enables us to make inferences about firm financial reporting policies by measuring the 
(easily observable) degree of competition faced by firms in product markets. Second, 
although the negative association between information transparency and earnings 
management is well known in the accounting literature (Dye, 1988, Kang, Palmon and 
Sudit, 2009, Richardson, 2000, and Trueman and Titman, 1988), we feature a novel 
mechanism in which information transparency decreases earnings manipulation through 
its impact on the marginal effect of product competition; henceforth we stress the 
interplay between information transparency and market competition to explain the quality 
of accounting practices when corporate accounting earnings are required to be consistent 
with firm strategies in the product market. Additionally we contribute to the corporate 
governance literature by showing the dark side of product market competition. Long 
lauded as a mechanism that increases efficiency, reduces agency costs and deters 
managerial slack (Baggs and Bettignies, 2007, Hart, 1983, Schmidt, 1997) this paper 
shows that under some conditions product market competition may exacerbate  the 
agency problem between managers and firm owners. Given that recent findings that show 
that corporate governance only matters in non-competitive industries (Giroud and 





governance structures could also be necessary in competitive industries. The rest of the 
paper is structured as follows. Section I provides a simple analytical framework to 
understand the relationship between market competition and earnings manipulation in 
two different information scenarios. Section II describes the data and variable 
construction. Section III discusses our empirical strategy. Section IV displays our main 
results. Section V contains the discussion of the robustness tests while Section VI 
concludes. 
I.  Analytical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
In generally accepted terms, earnings management occurs “when managers use 
judgment in financial reporting, and in structuring transactions, to alter financial reports 
to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999, p. 368). Managers can manipulate earnings to inflate 
their compensation (Carter, Lynch and Zechman, 2009); benefit from insider trading 
gains (Kedia and Philippon, 2009) or just to camouflage straightforward appropriation 
like in the case of Tyco. We study the relationship between product market competition 
and earnings management with a simple oligopoly model with imperfect information in 
which variations of the market competition is driven by exogenous changes in the number 
of competitors
1. As in Bagnoli and Watts (2007) (but opposed to previous literature about 
information disclosure like Darrough, 1993; Raith, 1996; Vives, 2006) in our model firms 
can bias the information they report. Unlike Bagnoli and Watts (2007) we do not assume 
                                                 
1 Equivalently, we could build a more complex model with free entry in which N is determined 
endogeneously by the interplay between market size, fixed costs of production and strength of market 
competition as in Sutton (1991). Since our purposes is not building a fully fledged theoretical model  we 
simply model N as exogenous keeping in mind that changes in N are driven by changes in exogenous 





that there is an exogenous cost of misreporting since in our model the benefits and costs 
of misreporting are pure agency considerations in which CEOs have private incentives to 
maximize short term market value.  
In our setup we follow a simplified version of the Cournot model with imperfect 
information presented in Vives (2002). We consider N firms that compete in a market 
with a homogeneous product.  There are m consumers each one with a utility function 
U(x) = αx-βx
2/2-px, where α>0; β>0; p is unit price while x represents the consumption 
level. With these preferences, the inverse demand function is given by Pm(X) = α-βmX, 
where βm = β/m and X is total output. Each firm i has a cost function given by Ci(x) = θix; 
where θi can have two values with equal probability: θH  or θL; where θH  > θL >0. 
The N firms compete a la Cournot in two consecutive periods. θi is drawn 
independently each period meaning that firms with high costs in period 1 may have low 
costs the next period. For simplicity we assume that the unit cost of production in period 
2 is independent of the unit cost of production achieved in period 1. That is, we assume 
that        
    
  ⁄              
    1 / 2  where the super-index identifies the period.  
We assume that risk neutral managers manipulate earnings not for achieving any 
strategic advantage as in Bagnoli and Watts (2007) but rather as an expression of the 
agency problem between managers and shareholders. We model this by assuming that 
managerial compensation is designed such that managers have incentives to maximize the 
market value of the company in period 1 at the expense of market value in period 2. For 
this, we assume that managerial compensation is w+µ1 MV1 + µ2MV2, where w represents 
fixed wage and MVt market value of the company at period t. , the critical assumption is 





thinking that executive stock options have exercise date in period 1 or because managers 
want to engage in insider trading in period 1 as in Kedia and Philippon (2009).  For 
simplicity and without loss of generality we assume that µ2 = 0. (Our results below hold 
whenever the difference between µ1 and µ2 is large enough). 
The timeline is as follows: at the beginning of period 1 managers realize what is 
the cost position of their firms and firms compete a la Cournot in the marketplace 
knowing their unit cost but ignoring the per unit cost of their competitors. Given the 
above assumptions, managers try to maximize firm profits separately each period and 
therefore we can rely on a standard Bayesian-Cournot-Nash equilibrium to find out firm 
profitability at period 1. Once competition has occurred and firm profits have 
materialized, managers report profit levels. This report has implications for the market 
value of the company since market value it is just the discounted expected sum of firm 
profits in both periods. 
In the second period a new draw of θ is realized, and there is a growth in the 
number of consumers in the market respective to period 1 equal to G, G≥1. Therefore the 
number of consumers in period 2 is m2 = Gm1.  As in period 1, firms compete a la 
Cournot knowing their cost of production but ignoring rivals’ costs. Once competition in 
the marketplace is realized in the second period, firms give to shareholders the 
proceedings that consist of the sum of profits achieved in both periods.  
If managers manipulate earnings in period 1 and report accounting profits higher 
than real profits  managers may get caught in the second period if the disbursements they 
give back to shareholders is less than what is expected. This will happen if in period 2 the 





when shareholders receive the proceedings of liquidation, they will discover that 
managers misreported earnings the previous period. They will impose a penalty P 
whenever the proceedings they receive are lower than what they expected. In contrast, if 
managers are lucky in period 2 and their firm gets, θL, in period 2, then managers can 
manipulate downwards firm earnings such that the extra proceedings that firms will 
receive in period 2 will compensate the missing profits of period 1. In other words, 
managers will not pay the penalty P for manipulating earnings if earnings are large 
enough in period 2 such that they are able to report a negative accrual in period 2 that can 
compensate the positive accrual in period 1. With this we are assuming that if managers 
suffer a negative shock in both periods then any accounting manipulation undertaken the 
first period will be exposed. However, if at the second period managers are lucky and 
productivity increases then they will be able to hide their deception the first period even if 
they will be able to provide more money than what they expected. This is managers can 
always claim that something good happen if they give back more money than expected 
but they cannot claim that something bad happened if they provide less money than 
expected.   
Next we study under what conditions managers have the incentive to manipulate 
earnings, given cost inefficiencies, and desires to increase first period market value. A 
critical assumption in the model is whether shareholders or analysts have access to 
information about prices and quantities in the marketplace. If they do, then a manager 
that wants to artificially inflate firm market value not only has to manipulate financial 
statements, but also has to manipulate the quantities produced and sold in the 





Bagnoli-Watts (2007) or in Kedia-Philippon (2009). On the contrary, if 
shareholders/analysts have no access to price/quantity information, then managers can 
simply manipulate earnings with no implications in real output and price outcomes. Next 
we analyze the implications of the model in two different situations, focusing on the 
nature of the relationship between product market competition and the likelihood of 
earnings manipulation. 
 
a)  Likelihood of earnings manipulation when shareholders/analysts do not have 
access to real market information 
In this case firms compete in the real market in a manner that is totally independent of 
any potential accounting manipulation. In both periods the Bayesian Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium would be achieved that we fully characterized in Appendix C.  Profits of cost 
inefficient firms are:                     while the profits of cost efficient firms are 
                   .  
In this set up, as in Kedia and Philippon (2009), we abstract from situations in which 
managers of efficient firms manipulate earnings to signal that they are more profitable 
than inefficient firms because if that type of signaling were to be available then no 
pooling equilibrium with accounting manipulation is possible. Yet pooling equilibrium 
with accounting manipulation exists as it has been systematically found in the empirical 
literature. We eliminate this potential signaling mechanism by assuming that 
shareholders/analysts distrust accounting earnings higher than the profits of the efficient 





they do not assign a positive probability of being efficient to those firms that report 
accounting earnings higher than the profits of efficient firms. 
We focus next in analyzing situations where the managers in charge of inefficient 
firms may want to manipulate earnings and report the same level of profits of cost 
efficient firms. This will happen when the gain in executive compensation surpasses the 
expected penalty of being caught next period. As usual in games of imperfect information 
two types of equilibrium can arise: a separating equilibrium in which managers running 
cost inefficient firms do not manipulate earnings and a pooling equilibrium in which 
inefficient firms report the same level of earnings as efficient firms. 
Separating equilibrium (equilibrium without earnings manipulation) 
The condition needed for a separating equilibrium is that managers of inefficient 
firms have no incentives to report superior earnings. The corresponding market values, 
MVi (θi) , in a separating equilibrium are:                 
 
R E  π  ;               
 
 
R E  π  . This will constitute a separating equilibrium as long as managers running 
inefficient firms have no incentives to report profit levels corresponding to efficient 
firms. The benefit they would achieve is a superior compensation due to an artificially 
inflated market value in period 1 is µ(        . 
However, by manipulating earnings managers may get caught next period. This will 
happen if in period 2 the cost inefficiency of its firm has not reverted. In this case when 
shareholders receive the proceedings of liquidating the firm they will discover that 
managers misreported earnings the previous period and therefore they will sue managers 
who will receive penalty P. In contrast, if cost inefficiencies are reverted by having a 





firm earnings such that the extra proceedings that firms will receive period 2 will 
compensate the missing profits of period 1. This happens because   
   π H
      
   π L
  
since   
        
 ;   
        
  and   
      
     . 
In this setup the condition for a separating equilibrium is: 
Proposition 1. A separating equilibrium with no accounting manipulation is achieved as 
long as: 
             
 
               ( 1 )  
(1) simply states that managers do not misreport earnings if the increase in managerial 
compensation due to accounting manipulation is lower than the expected value of the 
penalty.  
Pooling equilibrium (equilibrium with earnings manipulation): 
In a pooling equilibrium cost inefficient firms will report first period profits that 
are equal to those reported by efficient firms. Shareholders and analysts will not be able 
to distinguish between low-cost and high-cost firms and as a result market value in period 
1,      , will be equal for all firms.        
 
        
 
        
 
R E  π   
In this case, shareholders/analysts will underestimate the real market value of efficient 
firms and overestimate the market value of inefficient firms because they are unable to 
distinguish between them. This constitutes a pooling equilibrium as long as managers 
find it worthwhile to manipulate earnings. This is:  
      
     
 
              
 
    
      
    
 
            
 
        (2) 





Proposition 2.  A pooling equilibrium in which cost inefficient firms manipulate earnings 
is achieved as long as:            
       
           ( 3 )
  Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 together imply that for given levels of P and µ 
cost inefficient firms will manipulate their earnings to look like cost efficient companies 
when the difference between efficient and inefficient firms is large enough, while they 
will not manipulate when this difference is small. Figure 1 illustrates how the likelihood 
of the different equilibriums varies with   
       
 . 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
Overall, the intuition of the results so far is that managers will manipulate 
earnings when the difference on profits between looking efficient versus inefficient is 
sufficiently ample. The next proposition proves that the loss of being cost inefficient is 
larger in more competitive markets and therefore earnings manipulating equilibriums are 
more likely when competition increases: 
 
Proposition 3: When investors/analysts do not observe real market information, a pooling 
equilibrium in which cost inefficient firms manipulate earnings is more likely in more 
competitive markets.  
Proposition 4: When investors/analysts do not observe real market information a 
separating equilibrium with no accounting manipulation is less likely in more competitive 
markets: 
Proof of Propositions 3 and 4: See Appendix C.  
 






b)  Likelihood of earnings manipulation when shareholders/analysts have access 
to real market information 
As above we turn to identify the conditions needed for the existence of a pooling 
versus a separating equilibrium when investors observe firm activity in the real 
marketplace. The critical difference in this case is that if managers try to artificially 
inflate firm market value in period 1 not only they have to manipulate accounting 
earnings but they also have to change the nature of their real market actions to convince 
stock market analysts about their cost efficiency. As a consequence, the Bayesian-
Cournot-Nash equilibrium achieved is affected by the earning manipulation policies.  
Separating equilibrium (equilibrium without earnings manipulation) 
If there is no earning manipulation then the market equilibrium with imperfect 
information in the Bayesian-Cournot-Nash model is independent of accounting practices. 
As above we investigate the incentives of a manager running an inefficient firm to report 
earnings as if the firm was efficient to boost short term market value to increase her 
compensation. If a manager running an inefficient firm decides to act as if her company 
was efficient then her total compensation would be                      
 
 
        ; Where        represents the new lower expected market price if the manager 
deviates from the equilibrium, producing a larger quantity          and it is computed 
by                             . Note that in this case the deviating manager will report 
profits of      
                        while the real profits are                         , and 





Proposition 5: When investors/analysts observe real market information a separating 
equilibrium is achieved when the rate of growth of the market is large enough and:  
       
     
 
                  
     
 
            
 
          (4) 
Proof. See Appendix C 
 
Proposition 6: When stock market analysts can observe market behavior, a separating 
equilibrium in which cost inefficient firms do not manipulate earnings is more likely in 
more competitive markets.  
Proof: See Appendix C.  
Pooling equilibrium (equilibrium with earnings manipulation) 
In this case all firms will act in the marketplace as if they were efficient 
independently if they really are. In a pooling equilibrium firms correctly guess that all its 
rivals will produce the output corresponding to efficient firms. This means that in the 
Bayesian-Cournot-Nash equilibrium all firms will produce output as if they were 
efficient. Stock market analysts will realize that they cannot differentiate between 
efficient and inefficient firms and all firms will have the same market value,      
  : 
      
     
 
                   
 
                 
    
                    
    
       (5) 
For this pooling equilibrium to hold we need that no manager has an incentive to 
deviate. Given the off-equilibrium beliefs defined above, we just need to check that 
managers running an inefficient company have no incentive to report their true earnings 
level. It may be the case that managers running an inefficient company have an incentive 





deviating manager then would produce the output,    from maximizing first period 
profits assuming that all rival will produce   .  
The first period market value of the inefficient firm that deviates from the pooling 
equilibrium is then:     
                                 . 
Proposition 7: When investors/analysts do not observe real market information a pooling 
equilibrium is achieved when the growth rate is large enough and:  
         
              
     
 
             (6) 
Proof: See Appendix C 
Proposition 8:   When stock market analysts can observe market behavior, a pooling 
equilibrium in which cost inefficient firms manipulate earnings is less likely in more 
competitive markets.  
Proof: See Appendix C.  
Overall, in the scenario in which stock analysts have access to real market 
information we find the exact opposite results as when they exclusively have access to 
accounting information. In this full information scenario earnings manipulation is less 
likely in more competitive markets. This happens because the gains in market value of 
inefficient firms that fool the market by operating as if they were efficient decreases with 
competition. Intuitively, competition makes more costly for inefficient companies to 
operate output as if they were efficient.   
 
II. Sample Selection and Variable Construction 
We build our sample crossing multiple sources of information. For our main results 





we manipulate the Compustat segment data to construct our measures of sector 
concentration and number of competitors. Also, we employ the CRSP monthly database 
to calculate share returns, and the CRSP daily database to calculate share idiosyncratic 
volatility. The intersection of those yields about 68,678 firm-year observations for the 
main analysis, over the period 1989-2006.  The resulting unbalanced panel consists of 
14,463 firms. For the additional analysis, we use the I/B/E/S database to calculate the 
number of analysts following a firm in any given year, earnings forecasts, and earnings 
surprises. We use the CDA/Spectrum database to calculate institutional holdings, and we 
employ the Bushee (1998) methodology to classify institutional investors according to 
their investment styles and horizons. We utilize the Institutional Shareholder Services 
database to calculate board independence and the IRRC database to calculate the 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2002) anti-takeover index. Details about the sample 
selection are provided in Table 1. 
    (Insert  Table  1  about  here) 
 Dependent Variables 
Our main measure of earnings management is firm-level discretionary accruals (DA), 
calculated according the methodology of Dechow et alia(2003). Basically, discretionary 
accruals are calculated to be total accruals minus nondiscretionary accruals (accruals that 
are related to past accruals, sales growth, receivables, and property, plant, and 
equipment). We do an additional adjustment to factor in one year-ahead sales growth 
(Phillips, Pincus and Rego, 2003), and changes in cash, as per Chan et al. (2006). The 





a full explanation for the calculations involved to compute earnings management please 
see Appendix A. 
Measuring discretionary accruals is controversial and prone to error and it is not our 
intention to suggest a superior measure of accounting manipulation. Our results are robust 
to the use of distinct variants of the Jones (1991) model like the Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) construct that factors in the effect of earnings conservatism, or simpler models 
where we do not adjust for cash holdings. In addition to our base level theoretical 
representation above, we also examine other earnings management proxies such as 
meeting/beating analyst forecasts (beating the benchmark has been identified in the 
literature as a strong motivation for earnings management (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 
1997), and the earnings quality measure of Dechow and Dichev (2002). 
Independent variables  
Product market competition 
We construct three different market competition proxies. First we construct the 
Herfindahl- Hirschman Index, HHI, for each industry in the Fama-French classification. 
This is a standard index of industry concentration used profusely in the standard 
Industrial Organization literature that is computed by adding the square of the market 
share of all players operating in an industry a given year. We compute total sales in 
industry i by considering all non-diversified companies included in Compustat, active 
solely in industry i as well as those divisions of diversified firms that report industry i as 
their primary sector of activity. This is the same measure of concentration used by other 
studies like Hou and Robinson (2006) that explore the impact of competition on stock 





also replicated all the analysis with competition variables measures aggregated at the 
four-digit NAICS level and the results are qualitatively the same. 
Note that this HHI is constructed using exclusively information from public 
companies in Compustat, and therefore it is an upwards biased estimator of the real HHI. 
However, it constitutes a good proxy for industry concentration since larger firms are 
usually public and this limits the importance of the bias. Furthermore, a large number of 
small local private companies may not be competing with large national or international 
companies even if they operate in the same NAICS code. For this reason, our in-sample 
concentration index might be a better proxy of the relevant extent of market competition 
for public companies. The only alternative would consist in using the HHI reported by the 
US census (Ali, Klasa and Yeung, 2009). However the US census only provides 
concentration indexes for manufacturing industries and this data is only available one out 
of every five years. This would complicate the analysis with firm or industry fixed 
effects, which are so essential to our empirical strategy as we discuss below. Finally, we 
multiply the HHI by minus one to compute a variable, Competition, to facilitate the 
interpretation of the regression coefficients.    
The number of competitors in the same industry (#Competitors) is taken as 
another proxy for the intensity of competition, again using industries defined a la Fama-
French. As above, both divisions of diversified firms and non-diversified firms active in 
the same sector are considered as competitors. In the empirical analysis below we do not 
report all results with #Competitors as independent variable to avoid flooding the paper 
with tables, but results are qualitatively consistent with those obtained using Competition 





For our last measure of competition we utilize measures of import penetration and 
industry tariff protection obtained from the John Romalis U.S. Tariff Database 1989-2001 
files, the TradeStats Express National Trade Data, and the U.S. Industry Annual 
Accounts data section in the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce as reported in Xu (2006). Utilizing this data, we construct measures of import 
penetration and industry tariff protection, covering a total of 21 manufacturing industries 
(3-digits NAICS level) for the period 1994-2001.  
A large percentage of firms in our sample (31%) are diversified, and as such they 
operate in more than one industry. The corresponding market competition proxy for these 
companies is constructed as the weighted average, of the market competition, in all the 
industries in which the company operates, where the weights are given by the percentage 
of firm sales in each industry.  
Control Variables 
We employ a number of controls in our statistical tests, based on variables identified 
in prior literature to be related either to earnings management or to stock price volatility. 
logMktVal denotes the logarithm of the market value of equity, used as a control for  
higher visibility and less information asymmetry in larger companies (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986; Bhushan, 1989)
2.  Market competition decreases earnings and firms 
with lower earnings are more prone to engage in earning management practices 
(McNichols and Wilson, 1988; Francis, Hanna and Vincent, 1996).  We ensure that lower 
profitability is not driving our results introducing as control variable Return on assets, 
                                                 
2 As firm size is an important regressor, we checked for the robustness of our results given various alternate 
specifications of our firm size variable. We re-run our regressions using the non-logarithmic form of our 
size variable (MktVal), results remain the same. We employ firm assets in lieu of the market value of 
equity, results are qualitatively similar. Finally, instead of logMktVal we employ 10 (and 40) dummies for 





ROA, calculated as net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. We also 
control by firm stock market returns that provide a more future oriented perspective on 
firm performance than accounting profits with the control variable Return, which is fiscal 
year stock market returns. We control for a firm’s investment opportunity set and growth 
opportunities by calculating MB, which is the market value of equity divided by the book 
value of equity. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets, controlling for adverse 
selection and equity risk (Trueman and Titman,1988). We compute Volatility according 
to the methodology of Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2009), which is the firm level 
idiosyncratic volatility, given that firm risk and earnings management decisions are 
related (Grant et al., 2009). Finally, we also control for year and industry effects using 
year and industry dummies. Other variables used in the robustness tests and other 
analyses are discussed in the respective sections. The definitions of the main variables are 
summarized in Table 2. 
        (Insert Table 2 around here) 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample period, all variables 
winsorized at 1% and 99%. We see that in our sample the absolute value of mean 
discretionary accruals (DA) is 0.14, while the median is 0.06, this is due to the fact that 
the estimation process is noisy and yields large tails (these numbers compare well to Yu, 
2009)
3. Competition, our measure of industrial competition, has a mean of -0.06 (median 
= -0.05), while mean number of competitors per industry is 356 (median = 280).. 
                                                 
3 Given that the estimation of earnings management involves errors, and produces extreme tails, repeating 
our forthcoming multivariate analysis using ranks of this variable, or winsorization at 5% at each end, 
leaves results unchanged. We conclude that the distributional properties of this variable are not driving our 





Descriptive statistics of the rest of the control variables are comparable to other studies 
utilizing Compustat, hence are not discussed.  
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
Table 4 shows the Pearson correlations among our variables. We see that our measure 
of earnings management, DA, is positively and significantly related to Competition. We 
also see that Competition is negatively and significantly correlated with ROA  and 
negatively correlated (but no significantly) with Return suggesting that competition is 
indeed related to lower firm profitability. Finally, we see that earnings management is 
positively related to MB, and negatively related to Mktval, suggesting that smaller firms 
with higher growth opportunities manage more their earnings (see Roychowdhury, 2006).  
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
III. Empirical Strategy 
As argued above, we hypothesize that a firm’s competitive environment affects 
executive decisions to misreport firm earnings. From this perspective, we assume that 
earnings management of firm i at time t,                    
 , can be represented in 
the following linear form: 
 
                    
                 
                        
          
   
             
          
                    
                
               
                
    (7) 
 
Where represent   year effects,   represent other industry effects, the name of the control 
variables is self-explanatory while   
  accounts for other remaining unobserved firm level 





In our empirical analysis displayed below we run a set of linear regressions to 
estimate the relation between earnings management and market competition. Although 
we use a simultaneous specification, one could argue that the effect of competition on the 
incentives to manipulate earning is not contemporaneous but rather they require some 
time to settle in. Our results below are robust to lagging the independent variables one 
year.  
The standard measures of earnings management used in the literature and in this paper 
adjust by industry membership (see Appendix A for details of how we compute our 
dependent variable). This practice is thought precisely to control by any industry effects 
that may affect earnings management practices. Given that product market competition is 
one industry characteristic among many, one could question whether the effects of 
competition could be taken into account by the usual accounting procedures that adjust by 
industry membership in a yearly basis. However there are two reasons that prevent 
standard industry adjustments to eliminate the effect of market competition on earnings 
management. First, consistent with the theoretical model, product market competition 
may not affect symmetrically all firms in the same industry. In particular only firms that 
have a competitive disadvantage will be those which market competition will induce to 
manipulate their accounting statements; while this will not be the case for firms that 
enjoy relative competitive superiority. These differential effects for firms competing in 
the same industry is what will allows us to estimate an effect of market competition on 
earnings management even if we adjust by industry membership.  In appendix B we offer 
a brief mathematical illustration of this argument. Second, note that even if the proxies of 
market competition,             





             
  has firm level variability given that each diversified firm has potentially a 
distinct value for              
   and this is why our regressions are at the firm level 
rather than at the industry level (our results still hold if we eliminate all diversified firms 
and rerun our basic model)  
In all our specification we additionally include industry dummies. These industry 
dummies represent Fama-French industries in those regressions with Competition and 
#Competitors as independent variables, and we utilize three-digit NAICS codes for those 
regressions with Imports as proxy of market competition (We are then consistent with the 
industry definition used to compute each competition variable). The inclusion of industry 
dummies is important because of two separate reasons. First, as Nickell (1996) points out 
market share-based measures of market power (such as Competition) have little value 
when utilized in a cross-section but instead are more reliable when exploiting the 
explanatory power of their time variability, as we do when introducing industry dummies. 
Second, earnings manipulation levels may vary systematically across industries (Jones, 
1991). Adding industry dummies avoids biases caused by the presence of unobserved 
industry characteristics that could be correlated at the same time with the intensity of 
earnings manipulation and market competition proxies.  
We also estimate regressions with firm fixed effects to take into account generic 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. Note also that we cannot run regressions with industry 
dummies and firm fixed effects at the same time since this would require having enough 
number of firms that switch industries during the sample period. Besides, industry fixed 





A potential drawback of our analysis is the potential endogeneity of Competition 
and  #Competitors and standard reverse causation arguments. In particular, it could 
happen that earning manipulation strategies modify market structure rather than being the 
result of competition in the marketplace. This could be the case if for example earnings 
manipulation implemented by incumbents to please shareholders and boost executive 
compensation makes the industry look attractive and induces entry of new competitors. . 
Additionally, Ali, Klasa and Yeung (2009) have criticized the use of product market 
competition variables measured with the Compustat dataset. Both issues are addressed by 
using an exogenous source of market competition as is the level of industry trade barriers. 
We follow Xu (2006) and Guadalupe and Cuñat (2009) using the time variation of tariffs 
as instruments for import penetration across three-digit NAICS manufacturing industries. 
As seen below, the results will not change qualitatively when employing this exogenous 
measure of market competition. 
    
IV. Main Results 
Table 5 displays the results of estimating equation 7 using OLS. Given that we have a 
panel dataset, we adjust for having multiple observations belonging to the same firm, by 
clustering regressions at the firm level using Rogers (1983) standard errors. The first two 
columns have as a dependent variable firm level discretionary accruals computed as 
Dechow et al. (2003) and adjusted both for future sales growth (Phillips et al, 2003) and 
for changes in cash holdings (Chan et al., 2006).However our results do not change if we 
do not adjust for future sales growth of cash holdings or if we use the Ball and 





independent variable while column (2) has instead #Competitors.  We see that both 
competition variables are positively and significantly related to discretionary accruals, 
indicating that higher levels of competition are positively related to firm-level earnings 
management decisions. This shows that the preliminary evidence in the univariate 
correlations displayed in Table 4 is not spurious and instead it is robust to the 
introduction of the control variables. 
Given that estimating discretionary accruals a la Jones is a noisy process and 
produces large outliers we windsorize the sample at 5% from each end to make sure our 
results are not driven by a few discretionary accrual outliers. Column (3) of Table 5 
discloses the corresponding results that again show a positive and significant association 
between product market competition and discretionary accruals.   
Columns (4) and (5) in Table 5 investigate empirically the effect of competition for the 
subset of firms that manage earnings upwards, and downwards, respectively. This 
analysis, similar to Yu (2008), indicates that stronger market competition induces firms to 
manage earnings both upwards and downwards  
The significant and positive association between product market competition and 
earnings management could be caused by standard omitted variable bias driven by 
unaccounted firm characteristics, such as unobservable CEO characteristics, regulatory 
structure, insider trading patterns, media scrutiny or propensity of takeover. Such 
unaccounted effects could drive the linkage between market competition and accounting 
manipulation reported previously. We address this omitted variable concern by running 
firm fixed-effect regressions. De facto, these regressions capture the effect of changes in 





Therefore, these estimations are free of any potential bias caused by any omitted firm-
level characteristic that is invariant across time. The corresponding results are displayed 
in column (6) of Table 5 that exhibits how the positive association between market 
competition and accounting manipulation is robust to the introduction of firm fixed-
effects. Finally, in column 7 of Table 5, we replace our earnings management variable by 
utilizing the original modified Jones model as in Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) , 
where we see that results remain unchanged.   
Regarding our control variables, in almost all specification firm size (logMktval) 
is negatively related to earnings management, indicating that larger and more visible 
firms manage earnings less (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Bhushan, 1989).  However 
in the firm fixed effects specification, the coefficient turns out to be positive and 
significant suggesting that firms that grow in size in a given year, are more likely to 
increase the degree of earning manipulation. This result is consistent with evidence that 
indicates firms undergoing M&As are more likely to manipulate earnings (Erickson and 
Wang, 1999). Additionally in all specification firms with better accounting performance, 
as proxied by ROA, are less likely to manage earnings (see Yu, 2008, for conflicting 
predictions regarding the relationship between profitability and earnings management). In 
contrast to prior studies, the coefficient of Leverage is negative and statistically 
significant in six out of the seven specifications and non-significant in the remaining one, 
indicating that firms with higher debt levels manage earnings less. This is contrary to 
prior studies that find that firms manage earnings to reduce debt contracting costs 
(Trueman and Titman, 1988), possibly because in non-refined setting, we are unable to 





and ROA that includes interest payment on debt, the coefficient of leverage becomes 
positive and significant)   .  
 Finally firms with larger growth opportunities (as proxied by MB) are more likely 
to manage earnings (as in Yu, 2008, Table 5) and consistent with standard thinking lower 
stock market return firms and more volatile firms have a higher tendency to engage in 
earnings management. R-squared is 14% indicating a reasonable fit for our model. 
      (Insert Table 5 around here) 
V.   Robustness Tests  
In this section we explore the robustness of the above reported competition-
earnings manipulation linkage. First we explore whether the results hold when we control 
for extant corporate governance structures. Second, we examine the effect of product 
market competition using an alternate measure of earnings management, by utilizing the 
earnings quality measure of Dechow-Dichev (2002), whose estimation is distinct from 
Jones type models. We also utilize the likelihood of meeting and/or beating analyst’s 
forecasts as an indirect indicator of earnings management (see Burgstahler and Dichev, 
1997). Finally we investigate the impact of using arguably exogenous measures of 
competition like the intensity of import penetration or the level of import tariffs.        
Klein (2002) provides empirical evidence that “good” governance structures are 
negatively related to the degree of firm earnings management. For the purpose of this 
study her findings are particularly important since Giroud-Mueller (2008, 2009) have 
recently shown how corporate governance seems to matter only in non-competitive 
industries. Hence, if we do not include controls for corporate governance it may be the 





literature has shown corporate governance to be related both to earnings management and 
product market competition. We calculate firm governance characteristics using two 
separate proxies: the percentage of independent directors on the board (data obtained 
from Institutional Shareholder Services, ISS), and the anti-takeover index developed by 
Gompers et al. (2003) (data obtained from the Investor Responsibility Research Center, 
IRRC). 
Table 6 reproduces the results of estimating our main specification controlling 
successively for board independence measured as the proportion of outside directors in 
the board, the GIM index of antitakeover protection as elaborated by Gompers et al. 
(2003); CEO stock options that is computed by dividing the total number of stock options 
divided by total shares outstanding
4; turnover  proxied by the number of shares traded 
during a fiscal year divided by the total shares outstanding, and institutional investors 
type according to Bushee (1998). Table 6 shows how the effect of competition on 
earnings managements is not affected by the introduction of any of these corporate 
governance control since the corresponding coefficient barely changes and it is in all 
specifications positive and statistical significant. Note that the only corporate governance 
variables that seem to affect earnings manipulation are the shares owned by the distinct 
institutional investor types. More particularly the percentage of shares owned by short-
term oriented institutional investors (Transient) are associated with more accounting 
manipulation while the percentage of shares owned by more long-term oriented 
institutional investors (indexer) seems to reduce earnings management. This is fully 
consistent with the main intuition of Bushee (1999) according to which managers are 
                                                 
4 Using alternate measures of CEO equity holdings leaves results unchanged: we utilize a measure of CEO 
pay-for-performance as per Yermack (1995), or stock-option risk-taking incentives as per Rajgopal and 





more prone to manipulate earnings when a large proportion of ownership is held by 
institutions that engage more profusely in momentum trading and have high portfolio 
turnover.          
      (Insert Table 6 around here) 
Next we proceed to check whether our results extend to other traditionally used 
proxies of accounting manipulation. We first compute the Dechow-Dichev (2002) 
measure of earnings quality (DD). The Dechow-Dichev model measures the extent to 
which earnings map into cash flows, for each industry/year combination, over a five year 
rolling window. Given that this measure is influenced by earnings quality over a five year 
period, we lag all our independent variables by five years. The first column of Table 7 
displays the coefficient estimates of our main specification with DD as dependent 
variable. As before, the coefficient on Competition is positive to DD and statistically 
significant (t =4.2, P<0.01) suggesting that higher levels of competition lead to lower 
levels of earnings quality. 
We also assess firm levels of earnings management by using the probability of 
meeting/just beating sell-side financial analyst earnings benchmarks. Intuitively, 
companies that just meet or beat analyst’s forecasts are more likely to have engaged in 
earnings management that others that clearly did not meet them or surpass them 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). We compute MEET which is a dummy variable equals to 
1 if a firm just meets or beats (by 1 cent) consensus analysts forecast (9% of the firms). 
We obtain analyst forecasts from I/B/E/S, resulting into 52,532 usable observations. The 
second column of Table 7 replicates our main specification (7), but with MEET as a 





logit regression. The displayed results show that product market competition is not 
related to the likelihood of meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts.Next, we construct 
a different dummy variable, BEAT, which equals one if firm reported earnings meet, or 
exceed, analyst forecasts (58% of the firms). Logit regression whose coefficient estimates 
are reported in column (3) of Table 7 indicate that Competition is positively related to 
BEAT (t-statistic=2.62). This reveals an interesting pattern: firms that operate in more 
competitive industries are less likely to accurately meet analyst’s forecasts and instead 
they are much more likely to exceed it. This is consistent with the main logic behind the 
theoretical model of section II in which competition increases the rewards of 
manipulating earnings and similarly of exceeding analyst’s forecasts. However it is 
inconsistent with the standard view (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997) in which companies 
manipulate earnings just to meet analyst’s expectations. 
Finally, we investigate how robust are the empirical outcomes when we consider 
measures of product market competition that are arguably exogenous like import 
penetration and import tariffs. The purpose of this additional analysis is to rule out the 
possibility that earnings management from incumbent companies induces changes in 
market structure rather than competition increasing the incentives to engage in 
manipulation of accounting statements. Additionally, this measure does not suffer the 
problems identified by Ali, Klasa and Yeung (2009) when using product market 
competition variables measured with the Compustat dataset. 
 As explained above this data is only available for manufacturing industries and for 
the period 1994-2001 and for that reason our sample size gets reduced to 19,138 firm-





(10) using two separate, but related proxies of competition: import penetration, and the 
level of import tariffs. Note that since we include industry dummies (in this case at the 
three digit NAICS code level) then we are capturing the effect of changes across time of 
import penetration and import tariffs on earning manipulation practices. The last two 
columns of Table 7 show how more import penetration (more competition) is associated 
with more earnings management (t-statistic=1.93, P<0.05), while larger import tariffs 
(less competition) are associated to lower levels of earnings manipulation (t-statistic=-
5.84, P<0.01), supporting once more the previous results that competition and earnings 
management are positively associated.   
         ( Insert Table 7 around here) 
VI. Conclusions  
The empirical evidence reported above systematically and consistently points out 
to a positive effect of product market competition on the level of earnings management. 
This has been found with four different measures of earnings management, three different 
proxies of market competition, with different econometric techniques that alleviate 
endogeneity concerns and controlling by multiple variables that could be correlated at the 
same time with competition and earning management practices. These robust empirical 
findings contrast with the implications of the theoretical model in which the effect of 
competition on earnings manipulation crucially depended on the level of visibility for 
analysts of investors of firm output in the marketplace. If investors can observe real firm 
output and sales, then CEOs that want to manipulate firm earnings to pursue their own 
private interest are forced to act in the marketplace in a consistent manner with the 





more competitive markets and therefore competition should reduce rather than increase 
earnings manipulation. On the contrary, if investors and analysts cannot observe firm real 
output in the marketplace then manipulating earnings might be particularly tempting in 
more competitive markets since the amplifying effect in market value of good news is 
especially important in more competitive markets.  
Overall, since we consistently and systematically find in the data a positive 
association between competition and earnings manipulation then the evidence consistent 
with a world in which investors and analysts cannot observe directly what is happening in 
the marketplace in terms of firm output and prices. This is not entirely surprising since if 
investors could perfectly observe firm output and prices then the information content of 
accounting statements would be quite limited and the corresponding impact of accounting 
on the stock market almost null and this blatantly contradicts extant evidence. Yet, it 
could be the case that in some industries the visibility of individual firm output and prices 
is much larger than in others and accordingly the nature of the competition-manipulation 
linkage could be heterogeneous across industries. This possibility should be investigated 
by future research. 
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Computation of Earnings Management  
 
 Measuring  discretionary  accruals 
Consistent with prior studies, discretionary accruals is measured by using the 
modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995),
5 adjusted for the forward-looking model 
which factors in the expected increase in credit sales and one year ahead sales growth 
(Dechow et al., 2003; Phillips et al., 2003), and for cash holdings as per Chan et al 
(2001). A firm’s net income is composed of cash flow from operations and total accruals. 
Total accruals in turn are decomposed to discretionary and non-discretionary accruals, the 
discretionary portion is the part which is proxied by calculations following the work of 
Jones (1991). Total accruals are calculated as net income minus cash flow from 
operations. The following cross-sectional industry-specific regression is used to “predict” 
the level of non-discretionary accruals (NDA) from changes in revenue.
6 
 
TAt/At-1  = /At-1 + 1(REVt/At-1) + t                  (A1)  
 
Where TA = total accruals, A = lagged total assets, and REV = change in revenue from 
year to year. Nondiscretionary accruals (scaled by assets), NDA, signifies the part of 
accruals which is dictated by firm sales growth, and is regarded as outside managerial 
control. It is calculated using the regression coefficients from equation (1): 
 
   NDAt/At-1 = /At-1 + 1(REVt/At-1 - RECt/At-1)       (A2)     
 
We do two adjustments, the first one is the factor in expected increase in credit sales and 
one year ahead sales growth, by estimating the following model:  
 
NDAt/At-1 = /At-1 + 1((1+K)REVt/At-1 - RECt/At-1)  + Sales_GRt+1/At-1    (A3) 
 
Where K in this regression captures the expected change in accounts receivable for a given 
change in sales, and Sales_Gr is the one year-ahead growth in sales. We additionally adjust 
for cash holdings as follows (scaling by assets is suppressed):  
 
NDAt/At-1 = / + 1((1+K)REVt - RECt) + Casht + Sales_GRt+1     (A4)  
 
Finally, the non-discretionary portion of accruals is subtracted from current accruals to 
get the discretionary accruals: 
 
 DAt  = Acct/At-1   -  NDAt         (A5) 
 
                                                 
5 In the interest of saving space we explain the discretionary accrual calculation method with brevity. For a 
lengthier explanation, please see Dechow et al (1995), or Philips et al. (2003). 
6 To preserve the stability of the estimates, we omit any industry that has less than 9 observations with full 
data during any given year, our results are robust across various definitions of industry, including 2 digit 
SICs, or Fama-French 48 industry specifications.  







Mathematical example of how adjusting discretionary accruals by industry 
membership is not enough to account for the effect of market competition 
 
  Usual measures of earnings management are proxied by measures of discretionary 
accruals adjusted by industry membership with the aim of eliminating any industry 
effects that may affect earnings management practices. Given that product market 
competition is an industry characteristic among many, one could think that any effect of 
market competition on earnings management should already be accounted for when     
using standard measures of discretionary accruals a la Jones. Nevertheless, we show in 
this appendix how the effect of market competition is not captured by the usual 
accounting procedures that adjust discretionary accruals by industry membership.  
According to the theoretical model presented in the main body of the text, when analysts 
do not have access to real market information, the relation between first period 
discretionary accruals and competition can be written in the following manner: 
                         where     1 if         and     0 if            that can be 
written as: 
                               ( B1) 
Hence, the average of industry accruals, using the same distributional assumptions of θ as 
in the text, is: 
                           
 
               ( B2) 
Subtracting B2, the industry average, from B1 we get  
                                                         
 
              ( B3) 
B3 illustrates how adjusting by industry membership is not sufficient to eliminate the 
effect of market competition on discretionary accruals if the effect of competition affects 
asymmetrically companies that operate in the same industry.More generally we can write:  
                                                                   (B4) 
where X represent all other firm characteristics that may affect the propensity to engage 
in earnings management practices.  The industry average would be: 
 
                                                                    ( B5) 
Where                        ,          ,     represent industry averages.  
If we adjust by industry membership and we subtract (B5) from (B4) we get: 
                                                                                                   (B6) 
B6 again shows that the effect of competition on earnings management is not accounted 








Proof of Propositions 3 and 4: The Bayesian-Cournot-Nash equilibrium as in Vives 
(2002) represents that cost inefficient firms produce   
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and cost efficient firms produce   
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            and     1 , 2    denotes period.  
With this description of the equilibrium, and assuming we are not in a monopoly scenario 
then (3) is more likely to be fulfilled for larger N since: 
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happens       2. 
Proof of Proposition 5: With the assumptions in the model a manager may find it 
convenient to mislead about the real competitive position of her company only when 
there is a chance that their behavior will pass unnoticed. Under these circumstances, a 
cheating manager that reduces costs in the second period will disburse the following to 
shareholders: 
                 
                  
        ( c 1 )  
where note that in the second period the manager is acting as if the company was 
inefficient, while in fact it is efficient in order to boost market value and consequently her 
compensation.  
Shareholders were expecting: 
                  
                  
       ( c 2 )  
The difference of (c2) minus (c1) is             
      
  . Therefore shareholders will 
only receive what they are expecting or more when   
      
 . This implies that if the rate 
of market growth G is not large enough then a separating equilibrium is always achieved 
and earnings manipulation is not possible
7 , the rest is straightforward. : 




                                       ( c 3 ) .  
 
From (c3) note that           is independent of N but P(X) decreases with N therefore 
the left hand side of (c3) decreases with N rendering a separating equilibrium more likely 
with no earnings manipulation in more competitive markets. 
                                                 
7 Also one may think that by getting more money than expected, shareholders can infer that executives bias 
earnings downwards in the first period. We are ruling that out by assuming that penalty P is only paid if 
shareholders receive less than what they expect. Alternatively we can assume that      
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assumption   
      





Proof of Proposition 7:  
 
In the second period managers that have manipulated earnings will get caught if they 
are unable to reduce costs and once more their firms have    as a unit cost of production. 
However if their firms obtain a low cost of production then they will act as if they are 
inefficient in order to surprise shareholders by more than expected disbursements. The 
amount of money that the shareholders will receive at the end of period 2 will be: 
              
                   
  while they were expecting               
   
              
 . This implies that they will receive more resources than what they were 
expecting if   
      
 . That only happens if G is large enough. The derivation of (6) is 
straightforward.  
 
Proof of Proposition 8:  
 
First note that                             1                 that solving the first 
order conditions provide   ,          
    
              
   
           
Manipulating (6) we get that a pooling equilibrium will happen if  
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And Proposition (8) holds since 
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
 
 
Complete Compustat annual data for sample period      223,216 
 
 Intersection  with 
  
Compustat data to calculate Earnings Management        207,617  
 
Intersection with CRSP and full set of control variables      
 
Base  sample        68,679 
  
 Subsamples  for  various  analyses: 
  
Sample with I/B/E/S data           52,532 
 
Sample with Import/Tariff data          19,138 
 
Sample with Governance data (B.Independence/Gompers)   11305/17,783 
 
Sample  with  PIN        49,073 
 
Sample  with  Public       31,828 
 
S a m p l e   w i t h           1 5 , 3 7 0  
 









Competition = Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index in a given year multiplied by 
minus one. The index is computed taking into account sales of 
independent companies that report operation in that industry as well as 
sales of divisions -belonging to diversified companies- active in the same 
sector. 
 
#Competitors = Number of competitors in the industry in a given year including all 
independent companies that report operation in that industry as well as 
divisions –belonging to diversified companies-  active in the same sector. 
 
DA =  The absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated according to the 
forward model of Dechow et al.(2003), additionally adjusted for changes 
in cash according to Chan et al. (2002). Please see Appendix A for 
detailed calculations. 
 
PIN   The probability of informed trade, used as a proxy for stock price 
informativeness.  
 
Public   Public company activity as a percentage of total industrial output, used as 




logMktval =  Logarithm of the market value of equity. 
 
ROA        =  Net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets.  
 
MB          =  Market value of equity divided by the book value. 
 
Leverage =  Long-term debt over equity. 
 
Return     =  Raw share returns over the prior calendar year 
 
Volatility =   Idiosyncratic volatility, estimated for each firm and year as the annual 
average of monthly variance of daily market-adjusted returns. Daily 
market-adjusted returns are the excess of daily stock return for the 




    





             Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables 
 
DA denotes the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated according to the modified Jones model, 
adjusted for the forward looking model of Dechow et al.(2003), adjusted for changes in cash according to 
Chan et al. (2002). Competition is the Herfindhal- Hirschman index of industry concentration multiplied 
by minus one. #Competitors represents the number of competitors active in the same industry. PIN is the 
probability of informed trade, used as a proxy for stock price informativeness. Public is public company 
activity as a percentage of total industrial output. Mktval is the market value of equity. ROA is net income 
before extra-ordinary items divided by assets. Return denotes calendar year raw share returns. Leverage is 
firm total debt divided by the book value of assets. Volatility is firm-level idiosyncratic volatility. MB is 
the market value of equity divided by the book value. The time period is 1989-2006, all variables are 
winsorized at 1% at each end.  
Variable N  Mean  Median  St.  Dev.  P25  P75 
DA  68679  0.148  0.065  0.222  0.026  0.155 
Competition  68679  -0.068  -0.051  0.055  -0.076  -0.037 
#Competitors  68679  356.084  280  327.491  145  421 
MktVal  68679  1140.929  129.877  3158.486  32.167  632.392 
ROA  68679  -0.032  0.033  0.239  -0.028  0.072 
Return  68679  0.162  0.045  0.683  -0.248  0.375 
Leverage  68679  0.232  0.205  0.205  0.042  0.361 
Volatility  68679  0.047  0.025  0.064  0.011  0.054 










    
Table 4: Pearson Correlations 
 
DA denotes the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated according to the modified Jones model, 
adjusted for the forward looking model of Dechow et al.(2003), adjusted for changes in cash according to 
Chan et al. (2002). Competition is the Herfindhal- Hirschman index of industry concentration multiplied 
by minus one.. Mktval is the market value of equity. ROA is net income before extra-ordinary items 
divided by assets. Volatility is firm-level idiosyncratic volatility. MB is the market value of equity divided 
by the book value. Return is one year raw share returns. Leverage is long term debt over assets. The time 
period is 1989-2006, all variables are winsorized at 1% at each end. All correlations that are significant at 
the 5% level or less, are presented in bold.   
  DA Competition  MktVal  ROA  Volatility  MB  Return 
Competition  0.0344 
  
MktVal  -0.0267 0.0282 
  
ROA  -0.2563 -0.0352 0.1262 
  
 
Volatility  0.2004 -0.0194  -0.1736  -0.4142 
  
MB  0.1074  0.0085  0.1539 -0.1022  0.0058 
  
Return  0.0077  -0.0064  0.0542 0.2077 -0.0727  0.2321 
 




























Table 5: Regression Analysis Examining the Relationship between Competition 
and Earnings Management 
Models (1) and (2) depict the base level models with alternate measures of competition. Model (3) utilizes 
the same Dependent variable but winsorized at 5% at each end. Model (4) and (5) is for the subset of 
firms with positive and negative discretionary accruals, respectively.  Model (6) utilizes a firm fixed-
effects regression. DA denotes the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated according to the 
modified Jones model, adjusted for the forward looking model of Dechow et al.(2003), adjusted for 
changes in cash according to Chan et al. (2002). DA2 denotes the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
calculated according to the original modified Jones model As in  Dechow et al. (1995). Competition is the 
Herfindhal- Hirschman index of industry concentration multiplied by minus one. #Competitors represents 
the number of competitors active in the same industry. Mktval is the market value of equity. ROA is net 
income before extra-ordinary items divided by assets. Return denotes calendar year raw share returns. 
Leverage is firm total debt divided by the book value of assets. Volatility is firm-level idiosyncratic 
volatility. MB is the market value of equity divided by the book value. The time period is 1989-2006, all 




    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES  DA DA DA DA DA DA DA2 
Constant  0.105*** 0.044 0.093***  0.107** -0.019  -0.066 0.058*** 
[3.122] [1.377] [3.288] [2.410] [-0.688] [-0.302]  [3.109] 
Competition  0.290*** 0.195***  0.247***  0.331*** 0.126*** 0.128*** 
[7.501] [6.355]  [4.809]  [6.675] [3.234] [4.780] 
#Competitors  3.1e
-4***   
[27.15]  
Return  0.021*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 
[14.31] [14.37] [14.98] [9.422] [9.906] [12.37] [17.57] 
Volatility  0.192*** 0.158*** 0.146*** 0.253*** 0.173*** 0.159*** 0.114*** 
[10.06] [8.479] [10.14] [8.706] [7.205] [8.418] [7.490] 
logMktVal 
-
0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.006***  -1e
-4  0.011*** -0.003*** 
[-6.322] [-8.652] [-8.539] [-8.979] [-0.0207] [8.865]  [-7.471] 
MB  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***  3.9e
-4  0.001*** 
[6.373] [6.282] [7.786] [5.428] [3.625] [1.618] [7.998] 
ROA 
-
0.146*** -0.137*** -0.124*** -0.068*** -0.186*** -0.126*** -0.174*** 
[-24.79] [-23.25] [-27.93] [-6.486] [-25.85] [-23.69] [-33.08] 
Leverage  -0.011** -0.006 -0.011*** -0.005 -0.013** 0.007   0.012*** 
[-2.193] [-1.170] [-2.862] [-0.726] [-2.044] [1.063]  [3.162] 
Industry  Dum.    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm  Dummies  No No No No No Yes No 
Observations 68678 68678 68678 32623 36055 68678 79755 





Table 6: Competition and Earnings Management Controlling for Firm-Level 
Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Model (1) examines the effect of board independence, calculated as the number of independent board 
members divided by total board of director memberships. Model (2) examines the effect of anti-takeover 
indexes as advanced by Gompers et al.(2003). Model (3) examines the role of CEO stock-option holdings, 
calculated as the total CEO stock options divided by total shares outstanding. Model (4) looks at the effect 
of share turnover, defined as total number of shares traded during the year divided by total shares 
outstanding. Model (5) looks at the institutional classifications of Bushee (1998), defined as short term 
volatile investors (Transient), indexing institutions (Indexer), and long-term dedicated institutions 
(Dedicated). DA denotes the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated according to the modified 
Jones model, adjusted for the forward looking model of Dechow et al.(2003), adjusted for changes in cash 
according to Chan et al. (2002). Competition is the Herfindhal- Hirschman index of industry concentration 
multiplied by minus one. Standard control variables as per Table 5 are utilized but not reported (Mktval, 
ROA, Return, Leverage, Volatility MB). The time period is 1989-2006, all variables are winsorized at 1% at 
each end. ***, **, * signify significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES  DA DA DA DA DA 
Competition  0.204** 0.296***  0.239***  0.292*** 0.231** 
[1.970] [4.352] [2.925] [6.916] [2.129] 






StockOptions  -0.002 
[-0.983] 
Turnover  0.012** 
[8.090] 
Dedicated  -0.013 
[-0.726] 
Transient  0.064*** 
[3.551] 
Indexer  -0.038*** 
[-3.137] 
Industry  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11305  17783  16307  68586  9689 
R-squared  0.269 0.271 0.264 0.262 0.260 
 





Table 7: Robustness Analysis Examining the Relationship between Competition and 
Earnings Manipulation 
Model (1) utilizes DD, as a dependent variable, while Models (2) and (3) utilize MBEAT and BEAT as 
dependent variables, respectively, Finally, Models (4) and (5) utilize DA as a dependent variable.  
DD denotes the earnings quality measure of Dechow and Dichev (2002). MEET is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if a firm just meets or beats consensus analyst forecasts, zero otherwise. BEAT is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if a firm meets or exceeds consensus analyst forecasts, zero otherwise. DA denotes the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals calculated according to the modified Jones model, adjusted for the forward 
looking model of Dechow et al.(2003), adjusted for changes in cash according to Chan et al. (2002). 
Competition is the Herfindhal- Hirschman index of industry concentration multiplied by minus one. 
LogAnalyst is the number of analysts following the firm. Imports is the degree of import penetration (as a 
proxy for higher competition). Import Tariffs is the magnitude of import tariffs in the  industry (as a proxy 
for lower less competition). Standard control variables as per Table 5 are utilized but not reported (Mktval, 
ROA, Return, Leverage, Volatility MB). The time period is 1989-2006, all variables are winsorized at 1% at 
each end. ***, **, * signify significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES  DD MEET  BEAT DA  DA 
Constant  0.058*** -2.778*** -0.789**  0.137*** 0.126*** 
[4.139] [-6.006] [-2.292] [11.32] [14.51] 
Competition  0.339*** -0.079 1.044*** 
[5.708] [-0.111] [2.617] 





Import Tariffs  -4.69e
-4*** 
[-5.838] 
Industry  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  46866 52532 52532 19138 19138 


















Figure 1: Illustration of which equilibrium is achieved as a function of   









Figure 1 illustrates how the probability of getting an equilibrium with or without earnings 
manipulation depends on the magnitude of   
       
 . For low levels of    
       
  we get 
a separating equilibrium with no accounting manipulation, for intermediate levels we 
have no equilibrium while for large levels of   
       
  the model predicts an equilibrium 
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